Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Verification (Confirmation): In science, a confirmation refers to empirical evidence or experimental results that support a hypothesis or theory, reinforcing its validity or accuracy. Anyway theories remain open to revision based on new evidence or observations. See also Theories, Hypotheses, Experiments, Method, Verification, Certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Verification (Confirmation) - Dictionary of Arguments
I 54 Confirmation/QuineVsPeirce: infinite confirmation is not ideal but always correctable. False analogy of the limit value of an approximation to truth. II 36 Truth/Quine: is not confirmed by evidence! They could always be reinterpreted. Truth is intrinsic, there is nothing about it. Interpretation always takes place within a theory. >Theories, >Evidence. II 43 Quine: but we still see room for intuitive confirmation. II 44 We rely more and more on confirmed observation sentences through conditioning. The categorical observation sentences form the empirical content because only through them theory is linked to observation. V 61/62 Observation/Theory/Quine: here there are two relationships: one epistemological of confirmation and one semantic, through which the sentences get their meaning. These two relations are coextensive. V 63 Observation/Quine: e.g. face, hearing, touch, smell sensation. N.B.: for their role as confirmation or also as semantic reference points, however, it is crucial that they are something socially divided. >Reference. Problem: two people will judge them differently, partly because they notice different characteristics, partly because they have different theories. V 64 Solution/Quine: one should speak neither of sensations nor of environmental conditions, but of language. ((s) >Semantic Ascent). Fodor IV 37ff Verification (Confirmation)/Quine: cannot follow from meaning - Tarski/(s) in the case of "snow is white" it can naturally not be about verification - although statements are individuated through their content, i.e. that they are essential to them, from this does not follow anything related to possible verification - ((s) but certainly about verification conditions?) - QuineVsPeirce: (Peirce thesis meaning = method of verification): it can all turn out to be wrong, i.e. ~ even the meaning - ((s)> E.g. Putnam, stars replaced by light bulbs)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Verification (Confirmation)
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29